He begins with the world-bestriding British losing to George Washington's colonials, and mentions our less-than-victories in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The issue, he believes, is "asymmetry of interests," by which he means the extent to which a war is a "win it or die trying" proposition for one side but not the other. Here is the nub of his argument:
Great powers have multiple interests, and not all interests are the same. That means a global power is prepared to initiate and withdraw from wars without victory, for tactical and political advantage. Over time, paying the cost of the war becomes irrational. Great powers can “lose” wars in this sense and still see their power surge. Fighting in a war in which your country’s interest is not absolute, and therefore the lives of soldiers are not absolute, is difficult for a democracy to do.This is an interesting interpretation our our post-World War II foreign 'adventures.'
In most of the world, the great power will encounter an asymmetry of interest. Those who live there care far more about the outcome of the war than the great power does. And so, the great power withdraws from Syria when the price becomes higher than the prize. Given the string of defeats, it is expected that the great power is in decline. Like Britain after its defeat in North America, it is not in decline. It has simply moved on to more pressing interests.
