Writing at Small Wars Journal, two authors analyze how weaker forces can and do win wars of liberation against apparently stronger opponents. Their focus is on what is happening currently in Ukraine, but they bring n examples from Afghanistan and Iraq.
The first thing they identify is the stronger force misunderstanding the motives of the apparently weaker force, believing winning “hearts and minds” is possible when it mostly is not.
At its essence, guerrilla war boils down to a weak actor gaining a temporary force advantage in tactical situations in which they can “get in, destroy the enemy, seize some useful gear, and get out” before the opponent can bring sufficient counterforce to bear. This is accomplished in part because of “home-field advantage,” meaning the Ukrainians know the terrain (both rural and urban) better than the Russians.
It helps if the supposedly stronger attacking force (in this case Russia) has a corrupt military leadership diverting armaments budget to their own pockets in various creative ways. A final excellent point they make is this one.
A final important element in cases where the weak win wars: superior leadership. Leaders are effective to the degree they are like their followers. No other world leader represents their people more than President Volodymyr Zelensky does for Ukrainians.
His self-shot videos from the streets of Kyiv convey commitment and loyalty to the cause. Zelensky wears military-green t-shirts, he looks exhausted, all the while he and his family remain in harm’s way. He illustrates everything that it means to be Ukrainian right now.
Camped in the snow at Valley Forge, George Washington shared his men's hardships. He too had a supposedly weaker force. Like the U.S. in Afghanistan, eventually the Brits got tired and went home. Which leaves us with the question of what it will take for the Russians to "get tired and go home" as they too did in Afghanistan?
