Looking Back ... at Iraq

It is popular today to write that the Iraq war was a mistake. I believe those authors criticize not the expulsion of Iraqi invaders from Kuwait but the subsequent invasion of Iraq itself, done by the U.S. and the Brits. 

On the other hand, COTTonLINE's favorite interpreter of foreign relations George Friedman has written a defense of that war that I believe will add to your understanding of the context in which it occurred. He writes in part:

A major asset of al-Qaida was that it possessed a highly dispersed force that enabled it to group and regroup. It had demonstrated the ability to operate globally.

This was a force that could not be rapidly defeated. Nor could it be negotiated with or even located for negotiations. 

The United States could not accept the status quo. Al-Qaida had demonstrated its capabilities (on 9/11), and there was no reason it would not strike again. Lacking political solutions, Washington’s only option was a military strike – a broad and diffuse campaign designed to fragment al-Qaida.

Invading Afghanistan and Iraq was the only practical option if the goal was to cripple a very capable enemy. (snip) It was an unconventional counteroffensive, and this is what its critics dislike, but they offer no clear alternative. After 9/11, the threat was simply too great. The strategy was worldwide disruption. It was not pretty, but it worked. There were no other large-scale attacks on the U.S. homeland.

Friedman makes a good argument. I am willing to let history judge this invasion, having mixed feelings about it myself.