We have limited interest in Syria, we have limited capabilities, and we have limited influence. The question is how to use that best? These people that talk about a couple of hundred soldiers—which to be honest, are a speed bump to bad actors in that country—they’re not going to end the war in Syria. They’re not going to solve the problem. They’re not going to protect the Kurds.Hinderaker either ignores or doesn’t understand the “tripwire” approach to stationing small numbers of troops in an area. The presence of U.S. troops means if a foe attacks the area they will put our troops at risk and run the further risk of a war with the U.S. Most of the time it works like magic.
We’ve maintained tripwire forces for years in Korea and Germany, we are now also doing it in the Baltic Republics and Poland. Generally, nobody gets hurt and the costs are modest. Costs are often subsidized by those being protected, although not I think by the Kurds who are far from wealthy.
The validity of the tripwire concept is proved by the Turks waiting until U.S. forces left to do their “modest” invasion of northern Syria. If our guys were still there, the Turks most probably would have been cranky but stayed home.
On the other hand, I sympathize with the Turks wanting to get a horde of ISIS and Arab refugees out of their country, Arabs are notoriously hard to live alongside, ask the Kurds, Israelis or Persians or even the Turks for that matter. Assad’s Syria doesn’t much love this bunch either. And Europe has made clear they aren’t wild about taking them in (or back).
